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This study examined the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy 
in the Chinese market. Panel logistic regression was employed to explain the effect of 
foreign ownership on the choice "to pay" or "not to pay" dividends. Panel model used 
in this study is constructed by 142 companies’ data with 1988 observations involving 
foreign ownership listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2016. Findings 
indicate that a higher level of foreign ownership is associated with a significantly higher 
probability of paying dividend. This finding is consistent to agency theory and clientele 
effect theory. The significant positive result for retained earnings to total equity 
provides support to the implication stated in the life cycle theory. However, the 
signaling theory is not supported as the results show an insignificant relationship 
between cash flow and dividend payment, and between investment opportunities and 
dividend payment. The findings of this study indicates that foreign shareholders in the 
Chinese market have high preference for dividend paying companies, especially for 
large companies with low leverage. Hence for investors who prefer dividends, they 
should invest in companies with foreign ownership as the likelihood of these companies 
to pay dividend is higher. 
 

























Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan antara pemilikan asing dan polisi dividen di pasaran 
China. Regresi logistik panel digunakan untuk menjelaskan kesan pemilikan asing ke 
atas pilihan untuk ‘membayar’ atau ‘tidak membayar’ dividen. Model panel yang 
digunakan dalam kajian ini dibina dengan menggunakan data daripada 142 syarikat 
dengan jumlah 1988 pemerhatian yang melibatkan pemilikan asing yang tersenarai di 
Bursa Saham Shenzhen dari tahun 2003 hingga 2016. Keputusan kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa tahap pemilikan asing yang tinggi berkait rapat secara signifikan dengan 
kebarangkalian yang tinggi untuk membayar dividen. Penemuan ini adalah konsisten 
dengan teori agensi dan teori kesan pelanggan. Keputusan signifikan positif bagi 
perolehan tertahan kepada jumlah ekuiti menyokong implikasi yang dinyatakan dalam 
teori kitaran hayat. Walau bagaimanapun, teori isyarat tidak disokong kerana keputusan 
menunjukkan hubungan yang tidak signifikan antara aliran tunai dan pembayaran 
dividen, dan antara peluang pelaburan dan pembayaran dividen. Keputusan kajian ini 
menunjukkan bahawa pemegang saham asing di pasaran China lebih mengutamakan 
syarikat-syarikat yang membayar dividen terutamanya syarikat besar yang mempunyai 
leveraj yang rendah. Oleh itu, bagi pelabur yang mengutamakan dividen, mereka perlu 
melabur dalam syarikat yang mempunyai pemilikan asing kerana kemungkinan syarikat 
ini membayar dividen adalah lebih tinggi. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
In recent years, rapid development of China's economy has allowed the global 
population to see the potential of the Chinese market. Stock market plays a critical role 
in mobilizing savings and investment and this makes it an agent of economic growth 
and development in any economy. The importance of the stock market in any economy 
cannot be over emphasized. Compared with other developed countries, China's 
securities market started relatively late. Since the establishment of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990, after more than 20 years of 
development, until September 2017, the market capitalization of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) is US$4924 billion and 
US$3627.4 billion respectively. In terms of world ranking, the Shanghai Stock 
Excnange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange ranked fourth and eight places ( Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange Fact Book, 2016). 
The development of the securities market over the past ten years is shown in Figure 1.1. 
The black bar in Panel A of Figure 1.1 shows the aggregate market capitalization of the 
stock exchanges in China during the period 2006-2015. It increases from 
RMB8.94billion in 2006 to RMB53.1billion, which is an increase of six times. The gray 
color bar illustrates the gross domestic product (GDP). GDP presents a year-on-year 
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growth trend throughout 2006 to 2015 where there is an increase from RMB21.8billion 
to RMB67.8billion in 2015. The thick line in Panel A shows the number of listed 
companies in both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The 
number of listed companies increases from 1434 companies in 2006 to 2827 companies 
in 2015, which is a growth of 97% during the ten years. 
 
Figure 1.1:  
Market Capitalization, Number of Listed Companies, GDP and Ratio of Market 
Capitalization to GDP in 2006-2015 
Source: SEC Fact Book (2016), China Statistical Yearbook (2016) 
Panel B shows that in 2006, the market value of securities market as a share of GDP is 
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decreased sharply to 38% in 2008. A year after the crisis, the percentage of security 
market capitalization to GDP increased significantly to 71% in 2009, which was almost 
double than 2008. By 2015, the percentage reached 79%. Overall, the average 
percentage of security market capitalization to GDP throughout the period is 60%. The 
gradual increase of the percentage of market capitalization to the GDP shows the 
importance of security market to the Chinese economy. 
Since joining the (WTO) in 2001, China has opened the door to foreign investors. Many 
foreign investors are optimistic about the great potential of the Chinese market. 
Investment Report issued by the United Nations Trade and Development Organization 
Trade and Development World Investment Prospects Survey 2010-2012, stated that 
among the 15 most attractive investment destinations in the world, China ranks first and 
is the preferred investment destination of multinational corporations and institutional 
investors. This is further supported by Zhan (2016) where he reinforced that China 
continues to be one of the most attractive investment destinations in “The Global 
Foreign Investment Prospects and World Investment Report 2016-2018”. In addition, 
the Chinese government has also tried its best to attract foreign investors to enter China, 
gradually opening up the Chinese stock market to foreign investors. On November 10, 
2017, in order to implement the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China to further expand the opening-up to the outside world, China’s government 
relaxed the restrictions of investment ratio of single or multiple foreign investors 
investing directly or indirectly in securities, funds, and futures to 51%. After three years 
of implementation of the above measures, the restriction on investment ratio will be 
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lifted. For financial companies such as banks and securities companies, foreign 
investors follow the same rules as domestic investors. The limit of a single (total) 
foreign shareholding of no more than 20% (25%) is no longer applied. Due to the rapid 
development of the Chinese market and the gradual opening of the stock market to 
foreign investors, it is expected that more and more foreign investors will enter China. 
The detail of foreign investment during 2002-2016 is presented in Figure 1.2. The total 
amount of investment is on the rise, from US$52.7 billion in 2002 to US$126 billion in 
2016. 
 
Figure 1.2:  
Foreign Investment (USD 100 million) in China 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) (2016), CSY(2012) 
 
Foreign investment in companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange and foreign 
investors registered in Shenzhen Stock Exchange is shown in Figure 1.3.  
The investment in stock market ( the line with triangle) showed an increase tread from 
2003 to 2016. In 2003, the investment is RMB349 million. After three years, the 













Figure 1.3:  
Foreign Investors (000') and Foreign Investment ( RMB 100 million) in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Sources: SEC Fact Book (2016), SEC Fact Book (2013)  
increase to RMB2272 million and a sharp decrease in 2008 ( RMB688 million) during 
the subprime crisis. After 2008, the investment of foreign investors into companies 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) showed an increase trend from 2008 to 
2015. In 2016, there was a slight decrease investment in SZSE as compared to 2015. 
The line with dot showed the number of foreign investor in B-share1of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. The number of investors keep increasing from 2003 to 2016. There was a 
significant increase in 2007 (910,000) which is consistent to the sharp increase of 
investment amount. However, unlike the investment amount, the number of investors 
kept increasing in 2008 (938000) rather than decline and this figure continued to 
increase. By 2016, the number of foreign investors reached 1058000 as compared to 
1052000 in 2015. The average growth rate of foreign investors is 77% from 2003 to 
2016. 
                                                   
1 B-shares refer to the RMB-denominated special shares with their par values marked in RMB 
in their circulation and to be subscribed and traded in Hong Kong Dollars. The trading of B-
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Most of the foreign investment in SZSE comes from institutional investors (Jeon, Lee 
and Moffett, (2010); Kim, Sul and Kang, 2010; Ferreira, Massa and Matos, 2010). 
Figure 1.4 shows the number of foreign institutional investors2 of B-share from 2003 
to 2016. In the past fourteen years, the number of both foreign companies and funds 
which invested in China’s stock market show an increasing trend. A closer examination 
shows that foreign funds were more interested in China’s stock market than foreign 
companies. Before 2006, the number of foreign companies that invested in the China’s 
stock market is higher than the number of foreign funds. Starting 2006, the number of 
foreign funds shows a rapid growth where supersedes the number of foreign companies. 
In 2016, there were 6216 foreign companies invested in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
which is an increase 51% as compared to 4129 companies in 2003. During the same 
period, the number of foreign funds increased 133% from 4084 in 2003 to 9533 in 2016. 
 
Figure 1.4:  
Foreign Institutional Investors 
Sources: SEC Fact Book (2016), SEC Fact Book (2013) 
                                                   
2 Foreign company investors and funds make up institutional investors. Fund specifically 
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1.2 Problem Statement  
Listed companies in China do not show a consistent dividend payment where 
companies could switch from paying dividend to discontinue dividend payment or 
lower their dividend. A few examples of the inconsistency of dividend payment among 
Chinese companies are as follows. Meiling Electric Appliance Co., Ltd has been paying 
a dividend of RMB 1 (inclusive of tax) for every 10 shares since 1998; but starting from 
2002, it has not distributed dividends for 11 consecutive years. Another company that 
shows a particular pattern is Jiujiu Liquor. Since 2000, Jiujiu Liquor paid RMB 2 
(inclusive of tax) for every 10 shares. However, by 2012, it has not paid dividends for 
10 consecutive years. According to the statistics of Wind data in 2011, there were 173 
listed companies that have been listed for 10 years with no cash dividend distribution 
ever since they were listed on the exchange. Among these companies, some have 
substantial retained profits, such as Yuanxing Energy, Huaye Real Estate, Zhenghe 
Shares and Luoniu Mountain, where the cumulative net profits in 10 years were RMB 
1.074 billion, RMB 656 million, RMB 477 million and RMB 475 million, respectively. 
Wind data also shows that in 2001 the total undistributed profit of listed companies was 
RMB 48.3 billion, whereas the annual cash dividend was RMB 43 billion, accounting 
for 88.96% of total undistributed profit. In 2011, the listed companies’ undistributed 
profits reached RMB 3065.5 billion whereas the annual dividend was RMB 499.4 
billion. Although cash dividend distributed by Chinese listed companies has improved 
but there is still a higher percentage of companies that shun away from paying dividends.  
In order to improve dividend payment among listed companies in China, various 
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policies have been introduced by the Chinese government. In October 2008, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) passed a bill on "Decision on Revising 
Several Provisions on Cash Dividends of Listed Companies". The bill stipulates that 
"the cumulative profits distributed in the last three years in cash or stocks shall not be 
less than 30 percent of the profit realized in the last three years. Previously, the 
requirement was only 20 percent. Companies are required to declare the cash dividend 
policy in the charter and to ensure a continuous and stable the profit distribution. In 
May 2012, the “Notice on Relevant Matters Concerning Further Implementation of 
Cash Dividends for Listed Companies” promulgated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission re-emphasized the importance of cash dividends. The notice 
requires that companies which do not pay dividend have to disclose the company’s cash 
requirements in detail. On November 30, 2013, the “No. 3 Guidance on the Supervision 
of Listed Companies - Listed Company Cash Dividends” was introduced by the (CSRC) 
put forward that when the company's development is at the maturity stage and there are 
no major capital expenditure arrangements, the proportion of dividends in its profit 
distribution should be at least 80%. All the actions taken by the CSRC show that cash 
dividends have become one of the main agenda of the government.  
Apart from the question of why do some firms pay dividends while others do not, there 
is also a burgeoning literature that investigates how ownership structure affects 
dividend payout policy. There are varying types of ownership structures ranging from 
family, state, government, institutional, retail, foreign and domestic ownership. The 
basic premise underpinning these studies is that each of the different categories of 
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owners has different preferences for dividend payout (Arshad, Akram & Amjad, 2013, 
Huda & Abdullah, 2013, Adam & Javid, 2010). For instance, foreign shareholders may 
press for more dividends due to the high information costs they face and their inability 
to exert efficient monitoring as compared to domestic investors who are familiar with 
local market conditions (Bena & Hanouzek, 2008). Prior research on how ownership 
structure affects dividend payout policy have mainly focused on the US, UK, and a few 
European countries (Moscu, 2012; Bena, Elston, Hofler & Lee, 2011; Fons-Rosen & 
Hanousek, 2008; Kowalewski, Stetsyuk & Talavera, 2008; Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006). 
The impact of foreign shareholders ownership in dividend policy has not received much 
attention in the literature of the Chinese markets.  
As observed in the background of the study, the stock market capitalization in the 
Chinese economy is huge. The Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange reached in the fourth and eight places in the world ranking. The stock market 
plays a crucial role for the future development of the Chinese economy where it has 
attract the attention of foreign investors as can be seen in the increase of foreign 
investment and foreign investors’ ownership shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The 
opening up of China to the outside world together with preferential tax policy have 
assist in attracting more foreign investors. However most of the studies of foreign 
investment focus on the effect of foreign direct investment on the Chinese economy. 
For example, Wei (2002) examined the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
regional economic growth in China between 1985 and 1999; Jiang (2004) and Song, 
Tao and Wang (2015) studied the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on China’s 
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economic growth; Zhao and Yu (2012) studied the influence of FDI on the growth mode 
of China's industrial economy from 2000 to 2010 and Dai and Bei (2006) researched 
on the impact of FDI on China's economic growth and employment. The impact of 
foreign ownership in dividend policy has not received much attention as FDI. 
Perusal of existing research that looked into the effect of foreign investors on companies’ 
dividend policies is mixed. Black and Scholes (1974) believed that the characteristics 
of rational foreign shareholders lead them to favor dividends. Investors will increase 
their shareholding in high dividend-paying companies and this has been proven in 
Baba’s (2009) study of the Japanese market. However, a study by Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001) in Sweden shows a contradictory result. They found that foreign 
investors prefer cash-rich companies that pay less dividends. Nevertheless, studies from 
the stock market in India (Kumar, 2006) and Pakistan (Adam & Javid, 2010) show that 
there is no clear positive correlation between foreign shareholders and dividend 
payments. The lack of attention on foreign ownership and contradictory results on the 
relationship between foreign investors ownership and dividend policy instigate for this 
study to be implemented. Specifically, this study examine the impact of foreign 
ownership on dividend policy of listed companies in China. 
1.3 Research Objective and Research Question 
Based on the information provided in the background of study and problem statement, 
the research objective and research question are as follows:  
Does foreign ownership affect company’s decision to pay dividend? 
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To examine whether or not foreign ownership affects the decision to pay or not to pay 
dividend. 
1.4 Significance of Study 
This study would provide evidence about the effect of foreign ownership on dividend 
policy in the Chinese market. The findings of this study would be useful for managers 
and stockholders. For investors, findings of this study would enable them to understand 
the relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payment so as it could help 
them to make better investment decision. For companies that want to attract foreign 
investors, this study would provide them information on foreign investor’s preference 
on dividends in order for them to decide on dividend policy. To the academia, this study 
could be shared among students in order for them to bridge the gap between theories 
and practice in understanding the effect of foreign ownership on dividend policy of 
listed companies in Chinese.  
1.6 Organization of Study 
Chapter one gives a background explanation in the study which includes relevant issues 
related to the dividend payment. The chapter also discusses the research questions, 
research objectives, and significance of the study. Chapter Two contains the review of 
literature related to the study. This includes discussion of related theories and review of 
prior empirical works. Chapter Three highlights the methods to be adopted in 
conducting the study. The chapter includes research framework, hypothesis, data source 
12 
 
and method. Chapter four analysis the results of the study whereas chapter Five 


































2.0 Introduction  
This chapter consists of two main parts: underlying theory and empirical evidence. 
Following the discussion of relevant theories, the chapter presents detailed review of 
related empirical studies. Prior studies on effect of foreign ownership on dividend 
payout decisions were discussed. The chapter then proceeds to discuss other 
explanatory factors that prior studies have shown to explain dividend payout decisions. 
Empirical evidence on dividend payments during policies changes and crisis is also 
discussed.  
2.1 Underlying Theories 
Dividend policy is the decision made by the company's management either to distribute 
profits in the form of cash dividends or to retain earnings or to do both. It is a 
continuation of the company's financing and investment decision making. The study of 
dividend policy began in 1956. Lintner's (1956) study of corporate dividends, retained 
earnings, and tax distribution issues started the debate on dividend policy. Five years 
later, Miller and Modigliani (MM, 1961) put forward irrelevance theory (MM theory) 
which opened a new chapter in the study of dividend theory. Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) states that in a perfect market without taxation, investors are indifferent as to 
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whether they receive dividends or capital gains. Therefore, dividend does not affect the 
firm's value. However, researchers have argued that assumptions of the MM theory may 
not hold in the real world where imperfections exist. As such, different theories have 
been propounded overtime to prove the relevance of dividends when the assumptions 
of a perfect market are relaxed. These theories indicate why firms may be inclined 
towards one pattern of dividend above the other and why investors may have their own 
dividend preferences. 
There are four theories related to the research objective in this study, which are cliental 
effect theory, signaling theory, agency theory and life-cycle theory. The following sub-
section present the relevant theories.  
2.1.1. The Clientele Effect Theory 
This theory explains the fact that different groups of investors have different 
preferences for dividend payment. As a result, investors alter their shareholdings in 
response to changes in company policies and this has effect on share prices (Al-
Malkawi, Rafferty & Pillai, 2010; Allen, Bernardo & Welch, 2000). Dividend clientele 
refers to a group of investors with preference for a particular dividend policy that best 
suits their interests (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). Miller and Modigliani (1961) state that 
different groups of investors have their own preferences of dividend policy and that 
dividend policy has no effect on firm's value. Miller and Modigliani (1961) explained 
that there are costs associated with market imperfections, when there exists transaction 
costs and differential tax rate. Such costs influence the portfolio preference of investors. 
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In a bid to reduce these costs, investors may therefore prefer one portfolio over the other. 
The resultant effect is to either have tax-minimization induced clientele or transaction 
cost minimization induced clientele (Al-Malkawi et al., 2010). Based on this, Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) referred to dividend clientele effect as the likelihood that 
investors will favor a particular type of dividend paying stock. Although Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) recognized the existence of clientele effect and agreed that clients 
may be formed based on age or income preferences, but they disagreed that such effect 
has any impact on the value of the corporation because they argued that one client is as 
good as another. Miller and Modigliani (1961) further add that while the older clientele 
groups (such as retired persons) prefer "income stocks" to meet their immediate 
consumption needs, the younger clientele groups prefer low payout as they desire to 
accumulate wealth. 
However, other authors have shown that dividend policy has an effect on the value of a  
company. Tax induced clientele effect advanced by Brennan (1970) and Elton and 
Gruber (1970) is the most popular in explaining for the clientele effect theory. Brennan 
(1970) developed the asset pricing model which encompasses differences in the 
taxation of dividend and capital gains. In a perfect market, taxes do not exist but they 
do in the real world. Differences in the taxation of dividends and capital gains influence 
investor's preference for a particular dividend pattern. For investors that are tax 
advantaged, they would prefer high-yield firms while those that are tax disadvantaged 
will prefer low-yield firms. Some investors are indifferent to the dividend yield of their 
portfolio as they are tax exempt. In some instances, because personal income tax paid 
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by individual investors are taxed more, they tend to prefer low yield stocks than 
institutional investors who prefer high yield stocks as they are less affected by tax. 
Dividend preferences resulting from differential taxation on dividend and capital gains 
will depend on how capital gains tax is implemented in a particular country. With no 
capital gains tax at all in China, tax disadvantage exists on dividend relative to capital 
gains. 
2.1.2. The Signaling Theory  
Signaling theory was pioneered by Akerlof (1970) and Spencer (1973). Their work form 
the basis for other signaling theories of dividend. Some of the prominent signaling 
theories were developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and 
Rock (1985) and John and Lang (1991). The signaling theory of dividend proposed that 
dividend announcement relay information to investors regarding the firm's future 
prospects. Based on MM theory (1961), they assume symmetric information which 
suggests that all market participants have the same information about the firm. As 
opposed to the assumption of MM theory, the problem of information asymmetry may 
arise in practical situation as those within the organization like managers may possess 
more information than outsiders although information is publicly available (Khang & 
King, 2003).  
Different signaling theories have been developed in order to explain dividend policy 
based on asymmetric information. Bhattacharya (1979) tested the information content 
of dividends by showing that dividends could be used to signal future cash flow of a 
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firm. In the model, cash dividends serve as an indication of anticipated cash flow of the 
firm in an imperfect information condition. The author noted that the main signaling 
cost that makes dividend to serve as signals evolve due to the fact that taxation is 
imposed on dividend at ordinary income tax rate while capital gains are subjected to 
lower tax rate. Therefore, the model is regarded as a tax-based signaling cost structure 
premised on the possibility that signaling equilibria can be achieved. The model 
explains that cash flows generated in a period are used to finance dividends and when 
it is not enough to pay dividends, the firm should seek for external financing. Therefore, 
Bhattacharya's model is premised on the assumption that firms pay dividends even 
when they are taxed. This model has been criticized on the basis that it considers 
dividends and share repurchases as substitutes and on the grounds that it fails to explain 
dividend smoothing and it is only a single signal model. Lease, John, Kalay, Lowenstein, 
and Sarig (2000) faulted the model by stating that the model fails to explain why firms 
stick to a specific dividend level since there is no contractual obligation upon them to 
do so. 
Unlike the Bhattacharya's model, Miller and Rock (1985) used a two period model 
which shows that cash flows generated in a particular period is used to pay dividends 
and to re-invest in new projects. In the subsequent year, the situation repeats. The model 
is premised on the belief that managers consider dividend announcements as a reflection 
of unannounced earnings. As such, dividend announcements are used to convey 
information about future earnings.  
The Miller and Rock (1985) model assume that if a company increases the level of 
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dividend payment by sacrificing planned investment opportunities, it transmitted 
incorrect information that the company future is better than it actually is. Since 
investment decrease is not aware by the market before the announcement of the 
company’s actual financial report, this incorrect dividend information would cause the  
stock price to increase. Thus, investors who sell their shares between the date of 
dividend news release and the announcement of the company’s actual financial report 
will obtain higher returns. When the market fully recognizes the incentive of insiders 
to trade high dividends at the expense of investment, it would cause the stock price to 
drop. 
The Miller-Rock model shows that a company management must adopt a relatively 
high dividend payment strategy in order to deliver the company's performance. As a 
result, it sends wrong information to the market, induces the stock price to rise, and 
benefits the investors who immediately sell the stock. However this strategy defrauded 
new investors. If a company’s management contribute to use this strategy, it will affect 
its performance in the long run. The company might become the main target of mergers 
and acquisitions due to poor performance. 
John and Williams (1985) proposed another signaling theory that take into account 
dividend distribution and taxation, issuance of new shares, stocks repurchases and 
investments. According to them, the goal of internal managers is to maximize existing 
shareholders’ wealth through decisions of dividend payment, issuance of new shares 
and investment. Thus, decision on dividend payment must consider the marginal 
benefits that can be obtained out of distributing dividends. When a company’s 
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investment and individual shareholders’ cash needs are greater than the company’s 
internal cash supply, distribution of dividends would generate favorable signals which 
in turn cause the stock price to rise and the number of new shares to be issued to reduce. 
In this situation, equity dilution is small as the reduce of the number of new shares to 
be issued. But the premium of the stock price can make up for the taxes that 
shareholders must pay for dividends they received. If the demand for funds is less than 
the supply, the favorable signals generated by the distribution of dividends will be small. 
Hence, when it comes to dividend distribution, a company must consider the trade-off 
between the cost of depreciation of dividends and the marginal benefits of diluting 
equity.  
There are costs associated with signaling information to the market (Deeptee & Roshan, 
2009; Al-Malkawi, 2007; Miller & Rock, 1985). Al-Malkawi (2007) argued that only 
firms with high quality can use dividends to convey signals to the market and low 
quality firms cannot imitate this due to the cost implication. Deeptee and Roshan (2009) 
also noted that firms have different ways of sending information to the market but most 
importantly, the firm must be able to sustain the cost of conveying the information. One 
of the costs of signaling explained by Miller and Rock (1985) is the need to pay high 
level of dividends which small firms cannot imitate. 
2.1.3 Agency Theory of Dividends 
Agency theory is a theory that is concerned with resolving problems that emerge from 
agency relationships. Two common problems which are related to agency relationships 
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are the conflict of interest in the desires or goals of the principal and the agent on one 
hand, and on the other hand, the two parties may have different attributes toward risk 
resulting in inclination to take different actions. In the context of a firm, agency theory 
derives from the separation of ownership and control of the firm. The shareholders are 
the principals while the company management (executives) is the agent who runs the 
company for the owners. Therefore, agency theory in this context observes the 
relationship or interaction between the shareholders (as owners of the company) and 
the management (as those responsible for managing the company). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) in their pioneering work of agency theory showed that agency costs 
arise from the different objectives of the managers and the shareholders.  
Rozeff (1982) was the first person who applied agency costs to the study of dividend 
policy. He believes that cash dividends contribute to reducing agency costs, because the 
policy of paying cash dividends: (1) will put pressure on managers to ensure that they 
generate enough cash to pay cash dividends; (2) may force managers to raise external 
funds for investment projects so that shareholders can observe the use of the new funds; 
(3) It can reduce the amount of cash flow that managers waste on non-profit investment 
projects. In this way, shareholders benefit from a relatively high cash dividend payment 
policy.  
Easterbrook (l984) divided agency costs into two categories. The first category is 
monitoring costs. He believes that the discussions of dividend policy in prior literature 
are based on the assumption that managers are perfect agents. However, in reality 
managers are not perfect agents, nor are they perfect agents for shareholders. As long 
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as managers get the chances, they will do their best to pursue their own interests. They 
might not act in the best interests of shareholders. Therefore, a company must establish 
a corresponding monitoring mechanism to ensure that managers act on behalf of  
shareholders. The establishment of the relevant monitoring mechanism will inevitably 
be associated to a certain cost, known as agency cost.  
The second category is agency costs associated with managers' risk aversion. 
Easterbrook (l984) pointed out that managers' attitude towards risk is also one of the 
sources of agency costs. Managers are risk-averse. They tend to choose investment 
projects with lower risks and lower returns. However, shareholders have the opposite 
attitude toward risk. They prefer projects with higher risks and higher returns. However, 
the pursuit of high-risk and high-yield would be a cost to creditors’ interests. When 
creditors fully understand the behavior of shareholders and managers, they will 
inevitably restrict the behavior of managers through various legal terms. Among them, 
one of the ways they can adopt is dividend policy. Creditors will interfere with a 
company’s dividend policy in order to protect their interests. They might require a  
company to leave cash as retained earnings to support investment projects. This could  
reduce a company's leverage, thereby reducing the company's risk and allowing 
creditors to get their principal and interest back. The cost of transferring this 
shareholder’s wealth to creditors is the agency cost associated with managers’ risk 
aversion. 
Easterbrook (1984) also postulated that small shareholders have no incentive to monitor 
managers. Therefore, payment of dividends plays the monitoring role in this situation. 
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There are two predictions that can be inferred from Easterbrook's model. Firstly, a 
positive relationship is expected between dividends and the presence of small 
shareholders who cannot effectively monitor management as there will be a need for 
dividend to play the monitoring role. Secondly, the model predicts a negative 
correlation between dividend and debt level of a firm. This is based on the fact that 
creditors will force managers to leave cash as retained earnings to provide financial 
support for investment projects.  
Compared with Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook's theory has expanded the agency 
relationship of a company from managers and shareholders to creditors and company 
(including shareholders and managers), and also gives an insight to the effect of 
dividend policy on managers, shareholders and creditors. Furthermore, he clearly 
defined the content of agency costs and pointed out high cash dividends can effectively 
prevent managers from abusing cash, thus alleviating agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. 
Jensen (1986) proposed free cash flow hypothesis. He revealed that it is dangerous if 
excessive cash left in a company to be controlled by managers. The most effective way 
to curb manager’s abuse of free cash flow is to reduce managers' discretionary cash 
resources. Dividends are one of the most direct means to reduce managers' discretionary 
cash resources. Increasing the cash dividend payment or stock repurchase would mean 
returning the free cash flow back to the shareholders. This could avoid waste of free 
cash flow on low-yield projects and reduce agency costs. Therefore, Jensen's free cash 
flow hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between dividends and cash flow due 
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to the need to mitigate agency conflicts. Jensen (1986) also noted that in order to 
minimize agency costs, companies can reduce their free cash flow by increasing 
leverage which requires regular payment of interest. Thus, Jensen's (1986) theory also 
predicts a negative relationship between leverage and dividend; but external financing 
increases transaction costs. Rozeff (1982) in his cost minimization model explained the 
tradeoff between reducing transaction cost and increasing agency cost. The model 
showed that transaction cost that will be reduced through a reduction in dividend payout 
will be accompanied by an increase in agency cost. When dividend payout is reduced, 
there may be less need for external financing thus lowering transaction cost associated 
with such financing. However, this reduction in dividend payments increases the 
resources under management's control which may be invested into non-profitable 
projects or diverted for personal use, thus increasing agency costs. Based on this, it was 
argued further that the most favorable payout ratio is the level where the sum of both 
agency cost and transaction cost is minimized. 
In summary, the conflicting interest between managers and shareholders create agency 
conflict which can be minimized by paying out free cash flow in the form of dividend. 
This is because payment of dividend help to prevent the over investment issue that result 
from having free cash flow. However, such payment may lead to increase in transaction 
cost associated with raising external finance. Therefore, dividend payout should be 
maintained at a level where both agency cost and transaction cost are minimized.  
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2.1.4. Life Cycle Theory of Dividends  
Mueller (1972) propounded the life cycle theory of the firm. This theory which has been 
applied to dividend payout by Fama and French (2001) and Grullon, Michaely, and 
Swaminathan (2002). It gained more popularity from the study of DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Stulz (2006). The life cycle theory of dividend explains that the corporate payout 
policy of a firm varies over the different stages of its financial life cycle (DeAngelo et 
al., 2006; Fama & French, 2001; Grullon et al., 2002). The theory extends on the 
explanation of the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986). 
Based on the life cycle theory, a company continuously optimizes its dividend policy 
based on changes in investment opportunities. In the early development stage, a 
company has more investment opportunities. Thus, they will choose to pay less 
dividends to retain funds for good investment opportunities. On the contrary, in the 
mature period, a company has fewer investment opportunities, and less demand for 
internal capital. A company will choose to pay more dividends to reduce the waste of 
free cash. From the life cycle perspective, DeAngelo et al. (2006) found that the ratio 
of dividend payment is positively correlated with the ratio of retained earnings to 
owner's equity (RE/TE). The ratio of retained earnings to owner's equity (RE/TE) 
represents the stage of the company's life cycle. The authors indicate that firms with 
high retained earnings to total equity (proxy for lifecycle theory) are mature firms with 
sufficient profits that make them largely self-financing.  
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2.2 Empirical Evidence on Factors Affecting Payout Policies 
The sub-section present empirical review relating to the relationship between foreign 
ownership and dividend payout decisions and empirical evidence of other factors 
affecting dividend policy. 
2.2.1 Foreign Ownership and Dividend Payout Decisions 
In explaining foreign ownership effects on dividend payout decisions, most of the 
available literature fails to differentiate between foreign institutional and foreign retail 
ownership possibly due to data constraints. Foreign ownership emanates from a high 
proportion of shareholdings by the foreign institutional investors. There are two major 
strands of arguments on how foreign ownership affects dividend policy. Some of the 
studies have examined this relationship within the agency theory framework while 
others have looked at it from the perspective of the clientele theory.  
Foreign investors influence dividend policy through monitoring incentives which 
emanates from their substantial shareholdings and their adoption of global standards 
and practices (Jeon, Lee & Moffett, 2011). Based on the agency theory, dividend 
payment is regarded as a substitute to direct monitoring of firms by large shareholders 
targeted at reducing over-investment problem (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). Thus, 
on one hand, the theory predicts that a positive relationship exists between dividend 
payments and foreign ownership where foreign shareholders cannot directly monitor 
management actions due to geographical distance. Hence, the existence of foreign 
shareholders puts pressure for firms to disgorge out cash to serve as a substitute for 
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direct monitoring. When a firm is pressured to pay dividends, it reduces available 
resources at the disposal of managers. This may lead them to seek external financing 
from the capital market, thus exposing them to capital market monitoring (Rozeff, 
1982). Therefore, the theory predicts that a positive relationship exists between 
dividend policy and foreign ownership in the absence of direct monitoring. On the other 
hand, a negative relationship exists between dividend payments and the presence of 
effective monitors where direct monitoring is possible. This is because the presence of 
direct monitoring creates less need to press managers to pay dividends which may lead 
to capital market monitoring. 
In line with the positive prediction, empirical evidence have been provided that foreign 
investors can serve as effective monitors; but in cases where they are unable to directly 
monitor the firm, dividend is then used as a monitoring device. Manos (2003) examined 
how varying ownership types influence dividend policy in India and regression results 
showed that dividend payout increases as shareholdings of foreigners increased. The 
relationship was established after studying 882 firms listed on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange by using ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Chai (2010) provided the 
same evidence of such relationship in Korea when he analyzed companies listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2003 using probit regression. Chai (2010) found 
that the more foreign ownership inside a company, the higher the profitability of a 
dividend payout. By using a longer period of study from 1994 to 2004, Jeon, Lee and 
Moffett (2011) also found a positive relationship between dividend payout decision and 
foreign ownership as in the work of Chai (2010). This is also consistent to Ullah, Fida 
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and Khan (2012) who found a similar relationship in their work covering 70 firms listed 
on the Karachi Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2010. The positive relationship is 
also observed in developed market. Bena and Hanouzek (2008) found that a significant 
and positive relationship between foreign minority shareholders and dividend payout in 
Czech Republic by examining the firms listed on the Prague Stock Exchange from 1996 
to 2003 by linear probability regression and OLS. Baba (2009) also presented the same 
evidence when he analyzed 847 Japanese firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange1997 to 2005.  
Based on the clientele theory, foreign ownership may be positively or negatively related 
to dividend policy depending on the dividend preference of foreign investors. The tax-
induced clientele advanced by Brennan (1970) and Elton and Gruber (1970) predicts a 
negative (positive) relationship between investors who are tax disadvantaged 
(advantaged) and dividend payment. Tax disadvantage on dividends leads to a lower 
preference for dividend paying stocks. In line with this, Ferreira, Massa and Matos 
(2010) documents that foreign ownership influence dividend policy through foreign 
institutional investors. These investors pressured the firm to retain and re-invest 
earnings rather than payout due to tax disadvantage and high cost of repatriating or re-
investing the dividend income. Therefore, their presence drives down dividend payment 
as firms may shape payout policies to meet their dividend preferences. This result was 
established after studying firms across 37 countries between 2000 and 2007 by using 
the probit regression. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) also found negative relationship 
between dividend payment and foreign ownership in Sweden when they analyzed listed 
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firms from 1991 to 1997. In contrast to the study by Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2010) 
and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Manos (2003) found a positive relationship 
between dividend payment and foreign ownership in India. This is due to foreign 
investors being exempt from tax in India. Comparing with a 30% withholding tax rate 
for dividend in Sweden, a 12.5% withholding tax rate in Pakistan shows a big tax 
advantaged (Ullah, Fida & Khan, 2012).   
Few studies have offered explanations on dividend preferences of foreign versus 
domestic investors and how these differing preferences can affect corporate policies. 
Foreign investors are less informed about the market than domestic investors. Thus, due 
to the information asymmetry, they are more likely to favour dividend distribution than 
the domestic investors (Jeon & Ryoo, 2013; Ferreira et al., 2010). Ferreira et al. (2010) 
also postulated that weaker governance on the part of the foreign investors relative to 
their domestic counterparts may lead to the latter having preference for more payout. 
In line with the findings of Ferreira et al. (2010), Henry (2011) reported that domestic 
investors have significant preference for higher dividends as they enjoy greater tax 
benefits while foreign investors have less preference for dividend payment as they 
benefit less from the receipt of dividends. Other studies have also shown a similar result 
(Thanatawee, 2013; Kowalewski et al., 2008; Rantapuska, 2008). 
In line with the agency theory, Cook and Jeon (2006) found that foreign investors are 
active monitors. Their findings indicate that among the dividend paying firms, foreign 
investors prefer to invest in low-dividend paying firms. Furthermore, domestic 
institutional investors do not desire dividends and they do not play an important role in 
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a firm’s payout policy. Contrary to the position of Cook and Jeon (2006), Thanatawee’s 
(2013) findings indicate that domestic institutional investors emerged as the major 
investment group. They play a vital role in shaping the firm's payout policy; whereas 
foreign ownership has no significant influence on a firm's decision to pay dividends in 
Thailand after he analyzed 287 Thailand firms between 2002 and 2010 using Logit and 
Tobit Regression. In line with Thanatawee's (2013) findings, Kowalewski (2008) found 
no evidence to show that foreign ownership affects dividend payout policy when he 
examined the determinants of dividend policy using 110 non-financial firms in Poland 
between 1998 and 2004.  
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Factors Affecting Payout Policy 
Fama and French (2001) showed that there are other characteristics of a dividend payer 
which include higher profitability, larger size and lower investment opportunities. Al-
Malkawi, Twairesh and Harery (2013), Kargar and Ahmadi (2013), Jasim and Hameeda 
(2011), Al-Malkawi (2007) and Amidu and Abor (2006) found that firms which earn 
higher profits have better ability to distribute dividends because of their ability to meet 
dividend payment from internal funds while those with lower profitability were less 
inclined to pay dividend due to the rising cost of external finance to meet up dividend 
payments. Contrarily, Maladjian and El Khoury (2014) reported a negative relationship 
between profitability and dividend payout. They argued that most firms plough back 
for growth when they get more profit, which lead to lower dividend payout.  
Size is another important variable reported to have a positive and significant 
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relationship with dividends (Arshad, Akram & Amjad, 2013; Al-Malkawi et al., 2013; 
Kargar & Ahmadi, 2013; Mansuurinia, Emangholipour, Rekabdarlolaei & Hozoori, 
2013; Imran, 2011; Jasim & Hameeda, 2011; Al-Malkawi, 2007; Bebczuk, 2004). Al-
Malkawi (2007) reported that large firms have an edge above small firms in terms of 
their ability to access capital markets. Thus, they can raise funds at a lower cost and do 
not need to depend heavily on internal funding. This increases their dividend payout 
ability. This result was derived after examining 160 companies in the Amman Stock 
Exchange from 1989 to 2000 by utilizing the probit method. Contrarily, Ehsan, 
Tabassum, Akram and Nazir (2013) found a negative relationship between size and 
dividend payout and argued that size may not be a good measure of payout decisions in 
Pakistan. Other study, Azeem, Akbar and Usman(2011) found an insignificant 
relationship between dividend policy and company’s size. 
Apart from the characteristics of the firm such as size, profitability and investment 
opportunities advanced by Fama and French (2001), DeAngelo et al. (2006) also 
suggested that the implication of the life cycle theory can be tested by relating dividend 
payment of the firm to its combination of earned and contributed capital using retained 
earnings as a proportion of total equity (RE/TE). This ratio explains the extent to which 
the firm depends on internally sourced funds over the external capital. The authors 
explained that when equity is earned rather than contributed (high RE/TE), firms are 
likely to pay dividends. Khani and Dehghani (2011) explained further that firms with 
high RE/TE are considered as mature firms because they have more retained earnings 
and better ability to distribute dividends. This is confirmed by the empirical results of 
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Bradford, Mark and Qun (2013), Perretti, Allen and Weeks (2013), El-Ansary and 
Gomaa (2012), Coulton and Ruddock (2011), Khani and Dehghani (2011) and 
Thanatawee (2011).  
Cash flow is another determinant of dividend. Prior studies have shown that failure to 
pay out free cash flow as dividends resulted in its diversion or misuse (Chetty and Saez, 
2007; La Porta et al., 2000). Thus, dividend payout increases with higher levels of free 
cash flow. From another perspective, Adelegan (2003) argued that cash flow is superior 
to earnings in explaining dividends due to two reasons: the possibility of manipulating 
the accruals component of earnings; and the fact that cash flow is a better proxy for 
liquidity which is expected to be a good predictor of firm's dividend policy. Therefore, 
cash flow is reported to be positively related to dividends (Ahmed, 2014; John & 
Muthusamy, 2010; Amidu & Abor, 2006 and Adelegan, 2003). 
Leverage has also been found to affect dividend policy. Rozeff (1982) argued that high 
leverage firms maintain low levels of dividend payments in order to reduce transaction 
costs associated with external financing. Thus, previous studies have shown that firms 
which have high financial leverage maintain low dividend payments because they need 
to preserve adequate cash to meet financial commitments (Al-Malkawi et al., 2013; 
Arshad, Akram & Amjad, 2013; Bradford et al., 2013; Ehsan et al., 2013; Huda & 
Abdullah, 2013; Karami, 2013; Kargar & Ahmadi, 2013; Mansuurinia et al., 2013; Asif, 
Rasool & Kamal, 2011; John & Muthusamy, 2010 and Al-Malkawi, 2007). Benito and 
Young (2003) reported that firms with higher income gearing and leverage are more 
likely to engage in dividend cuts and omissions. From another perspective, some studies 
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document that firms achieve financial flexibility by maintaining low leverage (Daniel, 
Denis & Naveen, 2008; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2007). Contrarily, Mehta (2012) found 
leverage to be insignificant in influencing dividend payout. 
Literature indicates that financial policies of firms including dividend policies have 
been affected by financial crisis and government policies changes across different 
markets; and firms adjust their policies in response to the crisis and government policies 
changes. Although it is widely held in the literature that dividend cuts could send 
negative signals to investors, Reddemann, Basse, and Johann-Matthias (2010) contend 
that dividend cut is an appropriate act to ensure financial stability in troubled times. The 
authors observed that during the 2008 and 2009 global financial crisis, firms in the 
European insurance industry adjusted their dividend policy through dividend cuts in 
order to strengthen liquidity and preserve their capital base. Similarly, Bancel and 
Mittoo (2011) reported in a survey of French firms that one of the ways in which 
managers preserved their financial flexibility during the global financial crisis was 
through dividend cuts.  
As for China, the government had put forward semi-mandatory dividend rules in 2008 
and 2013 (as discussed in chapter one). An (2012) found that the dividend payout level 
of Chinese listed companies has gradually improved with the implementation of the 
semi-mandatory dividend rules after he analyzed listed companies in China from 2007 
to 2011. Similarly, Zhang (2012) and Wei, Li and Li (2014) have got an almost similar 
result in their study of listed companies from 2000 to 2010. However, contrary to the 
finding from the Chinese market, Adaoglu (2008) found there is no significant 
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relationship between dividend payout and mandatory dividend rules in Turkey.  
2.3 Summary of Chapter  
This chapter discussed the underlying theories related to the study. In line with the 
issues to be investigated in the study, the chapter presented empirical evidence on how 
foreign ownership can affect a firm's dividend policy. The chapter then proceeds to 
discuss other factors which have been documented in the literature on dividend payout 
policies. Empirical evidence was provided on dividend policy during the 2008 financial 





























This chapter will discuss the research design used to answer the objectives of the study. 
It will be subdivided into the following heading: research framework, data, method and 
summary. 
3.1 Research Framework 
Figure 3.1 presents the research framework of the present study. As shown in this figure, 
the dependent variable uses a dummy variable which is to pay or not to pay. Following 
Jeon (2010), Chai (2010) and Baba (2009), if a company pays dividend, the dependent 
variable Div=1; otherwise, Div=0.  
There are nine independent variables included in the study, which are size, profitability, 
investment opportunities, leverage, cash flow, retained earnings to total equity, policy 
changes, crisis and foreign ownership. This study is more interested to see how foreign 
ownership influences the dividend payout. The rest of the variables are treated as 




Figure 3.1  
Research Framework 
3.2 Hypothesis Development  
As indicated in the literature review, there are two theories (agency and clientele effect 
theories) that can explain the relationship between dividend payment decisions and 
foreign ownership. In line with the agency theory, the study expects foreign investors 
to have preference for dividends based on two arguments. Firstly, the study argues that 
foreign investors are less informed about the market than domestic investors due to 
different language and culture. Secondly, the study argues that foreign investors are not 
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based on the information asymmetry and lack of direct monitoring, it is expected that 
foreign investors will press the firms to disgorge out cash to reduce agency cost caused 
by excessive investment as foreign shareholders are not informed on how the firm 
utilize its funds. Thus, foreign ownership is expected to have a positive influence on 
dividend payment. Foreign ownership has been reported to be positively and 
significantly related to dividend payment by prior studies (Ullah et al., 2012; Jeon et 
al., 2011; Chai, 2010; Baba, 2009; Lee, Liu, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2006). For China, 
the cash dividend tax rate for foreign investors is less than 10%. This shows a big tax 
advantage as compared to the western countries such as the US (40%) and Sweden 
(30%). Therefore, it is expected that foreign investors will prefer dividend as they have 
tax advantage. Based on the foregoing, the study hypothesizes that: 
H1: Firm's dividend payment is positively related to foreign ownership.  
3.3 Measurement of Variables  
This sub-section discusses the measurement of variables used in this study.  
3.3.1 Dependent variable  
Dependent variable of this research paper is propensity to pay dividend. According to 
hypothesis one, the foreign ownership has effect on the decision of dividend payment. 
Here we follow Chai (2010), Jeon (2010), Baba (2009) and Fama and French (2001) 
who use a dummy variable (DIV) to measure dividend payment options. If a company 
pay dividend, DIV=1; otherwise, DIV=0.  
3.3.2 Independent variable 
As the objective of this research paper is to study the relationship between dividend 
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policy and foreign ownership, the main independent variable is foreign ownership 
which is expressed as the percentage of foreign shareholding (Ye, 2017; Jeon et al., 
2010). Based on the work of Ye (2017), this study uses B-shares holders, H-shares3 
holders, foreign institutional shareholders and foreign individual shareholders as 
foreign shareholders. The total percentage of shareholdings of these shareholders is 
used as a proxy for foreign ownership.  
3.3.3 control variables 
There are six companies’ characteristics that are used as control variables, which 
include size, profitability, investment opportunities, leverage, cash flow, past dividend 
and retained earnings to total equity. In addition to these firm characteristics, the study 
controlled for macro level variable such as financial crisis represented by a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 for the crisis years and 0 for other years. Furthermore, 
a dummy variable for dividend policy changes in 2008 and 2013 is also included. As 
the policy changes happened at the end of 2008 and 2013, the dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 for the year 2009 and 2014 and 0 for other years. 
In this research paper, we follow Lam et al. (2012), Jeon et. al. (2011), Chai (2010), 
Cook and Tang (2010), Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010), Kim et al. (2010) and 
Delcoure (2007) use the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets as the measure of 
companies’ size. 
Size = log (Total Asset) 
 
As for profitability, this study follows Jeon and Ryoo (2013), Lam et al. (2012), Chai 
(2010) and Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) measurement which is net income scaled 
by total assets (ROA).  




                                                   
3
 H-shares are shares of Chinese mainland companies that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
or H-Shares are shares of Chinese mainland companies that listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or 
other foreign exchange which are denominated in Hong Kong dollars and are traded in the same way as 




The next control variable is investment opportunity, market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity is used as a proxy to represent investment opportunity, following 
the work of Al Malkawi (2007). Baker and Wurgler (2004). 
Investment Opportunities (INV) =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
 
For leverage, this paper follows the proxy used by Thanatawee (2013), Afza and Mirza 
(2011), Chai (2010), Lee (2010), DeAngelo et al, (2006) and Ronapat and Evans (2005) 
which is total debt to total assets. Kim, Heshmati, and Aoun (2005) argue that firms’ 
financial managers are concerned with bankruptcy which is related to the book value 
of debt rather than the market value of debt. Given this argument, most studies prefer 
to use book leverage ratio.  





As for cash flow, a proxy used by Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2011) is utilized 
which is the ratio of net operating cash flow divided by revenue. 
Cash Flow =  




Retained earnings to total equity is another control variable that is utilized in this study. 
This ratio is a proxy of company development stage in the life-cycle theory (DeAngelo 
et al., 2006). El Ansary and Gomaa (2012), Khani and Dehghani (2011) and Fama and 
French (2001) argue that companies need retained earnings to investment during initial 
development stage. This would mean at this stage, there will be a high ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity and a low dividend payment. Conversely, mature companies 
would depend less on retained earnings. As such, companies will pay more dividends. 
Following El Ansary and Gomaa (2012), Khani and Dehghani (2011), DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) and Fama and French (2001), this research paper uses the ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity as one of the control variables. A summary of all variables used 
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Table 3.1  
Summary of Variables and Measurement 
Variables  Measurement  Sources  
Div payout option (Div)  
 
Dummy variables  
0= Firm does not pay 
dividend  
1= Firm pays dividend 
Baba (2009); Chai (2010),  
Jeon (2010), Fama & 
French (2001) 
Div payout level ( Payr) Dividend to book value of 
total assets  
LLSV (2000),  
Grinstein & Michaely 
(2005) 
Foreign ownership (Fow) Total percentage of 
foreign shareholding 
Ye ( 2017);  
Jeon et al. (2010) 
Size  Natural log of total assets Lam et al. (2012), Jeon et. 
al. (2011), Delcoure 
(2007), Chai (2010), 
Cook & Tang (2010), 
Mukherjee & Mahakud 
(2010), Kim et al. (2010) 
Profitability (ROA)  Net earnings divided by 
total assets 
Jeon & Ryoo (2013), Lam 
et al. (2012), Chai (2010) 




Market to book ratio 
(Market value of 
equity/book value of 
equity) 
Al Malkawi (2007). Baker 
& Wurgler (2004a) 
Leverage (LEV) Total debts to total assets Thanatawee (2013), Afza 
and Mirza (2011), Chai 
(2010), Lee (2010), 
DeAngelo et al, (2006) 
and Ronapat & Evans 
(2005) 
Cash flow ( CF)  The ratio of net operating 
cash flow divided by 
revenue 
Binsbergen, Graham, & 
Yang (2011) 
Retained earnings to total Retained earnings divided El Ansary and Gomaa 
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Policies changes           
 





Dummy variable, take 
value 1 for year 2009 and 
2014 and 0 for other years 
(2012), Khani and 
Dehghani (2011) and 
Fama and French (2001) 
 
 




Crisis Dummy variable, take 
value 1 for year 2008 and 
2009 and 0 for other years 
Hauser (2013).  
Abdulkadir et al. (2015) 
   
 
3.4 Research Design 
This section describes the data and method used to fulfill the objective of the study.  
3.4.1 Data 
Non-financial companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange ( SZSE) of China are 
selected for this research paper. Following Idowu et al. (2015), Jeon et al. (2011), 
Dominic (2010) and Baba (2009), the exclusion of financial companies, such as banks, 
insurance companies and investment companies is because they usually have huge cash 
flow and different information disclosure requirement ( Abdulkadir, Abdullah and 
Wong, 2015). Financial industry accounting standards are significantly different from 
other industry accounting standards, and related indicators are not comparable between 
the financial industry and the non-financial industry (Ye, 2017). This paper also 
excludes special treatment companies under the classification of ST and *ST. 
Companies classified as ST are those that have financial abnormalities or have suffered 
losses for two consecutive years; whereas *ST company refers to a company that has 
suffered a loss for three consecutive years and has been warned about the risk of 
delisting. Taking into account the accuracy of financial information and the company's 
continuing operations, this study removed such companies (Ye, 2017).  
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established on December 1, 1990 and is one of the 
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two stock exchanges in mainland China and is located in Futian District, Shenzhen, 
Guangdong Province. In comparison to the Shanghai Stock Exchange that only includes 
the main board companies, Shenzhen Stock Exchange includes not only main board 
market, but also the small and medium (SME) board and the ChiNext market. The 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange is more comprehensive than the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
Listed companies in the main board market are relatively large. The company’s total 
share capital is more than 50 million yuan. The number of publicly issued shares should 
exceed 25 percent of the total number of shares of the company. If the total share capital 
of the company exceeds 400 million yuan, the percentage of publicly issued shares 
should be more than 10%. The small and medium (SME) companies that have a total 
capital between 30 million yuan and 50 million yuan, are listed on the small and 
medium-sized board (SME) (Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules, 2014).  
In comparison to Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), most of the companies listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) are state-owned companies usually belong to 
special industries such as oil and gas. Generally, it is difficult for foreign investors to 
invest in these companies (Wang, Liu and Gu, 2009). Other than those differences, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange emphasizes on company’s information disclosure quality. 
Hence companies listed on SZSE attract more investors because of the transparent 
disclosures (Demirer and Kutan ,2006; Wang and Liu and Gu ,2009). Exchanges that 
have high disclosure requirements provide a more accurate data ( Wang & Liang, 2008). 
As such, following Ye (2017) and Lam, Sami and Zhou (2012), this study utilizes the 
main board companies of SZSE as the sample. A total of 142 non-financial companies 
with foreign ownership listed on the main board from 2003 to 2016 are selected after  
removing 14 financial companies, 53 special treatment (ST or ST*) companies and 267 
non-foreign ownership companies4. Companies’ characteristic data are collected from 
companies’ financial reports such as income statement, cash flow statement and balance 
sheet. All these data are available in the Thomson Reuters’ financial database 
Datastream and CSMAR database. The Datastream database has both corporate 
                                                   
4 267 non-foreign ownership companies are excluded from the study due to time constraint.  
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accounting data and the company's market value. It is a common database for economic 
research (Memon, 2015). CSMAR database is controlled by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRS). It has financial data and economic information in 
China. Ye (2017) used this database in their studies of dividend policy. Information on 
dividend payout ratio is taken from companies’ annual report which is downloaded from 
Datastream; whereas data on foreign ownership is taken from CSMAR database.  
3.5 Method 
This paper uses a panel data as it is collected across time and different companies from 
the main board of SZSE in 2003 to 2016. The panel data is supposed to be superior thus 
cross-section data because of the large number of observations and higher degrees of 
freedom. Use of panel data decreases multicollinearity problem and provides more 
efficient estimates (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Many empirical studies focusing on the 
effect of foreign ownership on dividend policy use this method such as shown in the 
work of Abdulkadir et al. (2015), Chai (2010), Jeon (2010) and Baba (2009). 
In order to fulfill the objective of this study which is to examine the effect of foreign 
ownership on dividend policy of listed companies in China, a logit model is used. 
Logistic regression is a discrete model. Leech, Barrett, and Morgan (2005) noted that 
logit model can be used when the model contains both continuous and dummy variables. 
In this case, the dependent variable is the decision to pay or not to pay dividends which 
is a dummy variable whereas the independent variables have both continuous and 
dummy variables. 
As logit model is a non-linear model, the assumptions related to the distribution of 
independent variables such as linearity, normality and homoscedasticity are not 
required (Schwab, 2010). However, logistic regression has its own assumptions that 
need to be satisfied. Firstly, there is a need to ensure that the true conditional 
probabilities serves as logistic function of the independent variables. As the dependent 
variable of this study is a discrete choice to pay or not to pay. The logit function is 
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appropriate as the link function to link the dependent variable to the independent 
variables. Secondly, it must ensure that the independent variables are measured without 
error. Thirdly, the observations must be independent. Finally, the independent variables 
should not be linear combinations of each other. To ensure that the above assumptions 
are met, model fitting test, model specification test, and multicollinearity test are 
performed in the following chapters before estimating the logit regression.  
Following Abdulkadir, Abdullah and Wong (2015) and Fama and French (2001), the 
logit model for the study is specified as follows:  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 =  𝜃0 +  𝜃1𝑓𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇1,𝑖𝑡      (1) 
 
Where:  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 = (i) Dividend payout ratio and (ii) Dummy variable where Div = 1 if a company 
pays dividend and Div = 0 otherwise;  
𝑓𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡  =  Foreign ownership;  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  All of the control variables which include size, profitability, 
investment opportunities, leverage, cash flow, retained 
earnings to total equity, policy changes and crisis;  
𝜇1,𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1,𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀1,𝑖𝑡 ,  
Where:  
𝛽1,𝑖𝑡 =  Individual effect item, 𝜀1,𝑖𝑡 ~ N ( 0, 𝜎
2).  
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the research framework, data and method used to answer the 
objective of the study. Most data for 142 non-financial companies listed on the main 
board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from the period 2003 to 2016 are collected from 
Datastream and CSMAR database. In order to examine the effect of foreign ownership 





FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.0 Introduction  
The results of the analyses conducted are presented and discussed in details in this 
chapter. The chapter starts with a descriptive analysis. This is followed by the 
multicollinearity test, model fit test, model specification test and regression results. 
Detailed discussion of the results obtained in comparison to the results of prior studies 
and the implication added in the theories. The chapter concluded with a brief summary 
of what is contained therein. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistic of the variables in the regression models. The 
sample covers 142 firms over a fourteen-year period. This yields a dataset consisting of 
a balanced panel data totaling 1,988 observations. An average of 56.2% of the firms 
paid dividends over the entire sample period. The table also shows that on average, 
foreign investors own 5.17% of shares in the Chinese market. According to Jeon et al. 
(2010) and Ye (2017) studies, this level has a significant impact on the company’s 
governance structure as it is more than 5%. The maximum value of foreign ownership 
reveals that there exist as much as 29.77% shareholdings by foreign investors among 
the 1988 observations while the minimum value of 0 indicates that some firms are 
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wholly owned by domestic investors in some years. The standard deviation of 9.1 
indicates that there is considerable variation in terms of ownership structure of the 
Chinese market. The mean value of foreign ownership is low relative to what is reported 
in other emerging markets. Bokpin (2011) reported 27.97% for Ghana market within 
the year 2002 and 2007; Kim et al. (2010) reported 31.39% for Korean market within 
the year 2001 and 2007 and Vo (2010) reported 14.80% for Vietnam market within the 
year 2007 and 2009.  
Mean value of cash flow is 3.1% for leverage (LEV), it shows that 59% of total assets 
are financed by debts indicating that many of the firms are highly levered. In 
comparison to the US market, Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) reported an average 
debt of 41%. As for the macro variables, the descriptive statistic indicate that 14.28% 
of the total observations are from the crisis period and the same percentage is observed 
for the policy changes period. The mean value for retained earnings to total equity is 
26%. This implies that on average, only 26% of the equity of firms listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange is composed of retained earnings. This is much less than 
44.42% reported by Thanatawee (2013) for the Thailand market. The size of firms listed 
in the market as measured by the natural log of total assets has a mean value of RMB6.6 
billion; whereas the mean value of profitability (ROA) shown an average of 3.5% return 
on total assets. This measure of profitability ranges from negative minimum value of -





Table 4.1  
Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Definition  Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
DIV (0, 1) Dummy variables; 0= Firm does not pay dividend  
1= Firm pays dividend 
1988 0.5629 0.4962 0 1 
Foreign ownership Total percentage of foreign shareholding 1988 5.1721 9.0999 0 29.77 
Cash flow The ratio of net operating cash flow divided by revenue 1988 0.0311 1.0656 -32.9167 3.8913 
Size  Natural log of total assets 1988 9.5981 0.6085 7.2777 11.9194 
Leverage  Total debts to total assets 1988 0.5896 0.8053 0.0444 13.7114 
RE/TE Retained earnings divided by total equity 1988 0.2612 0.6651 -4 17.53 
Profitability (ROA) Net earnings divided by total assets 1988 0.0353 0.2832 -3.8561 10.4009 
Investment 
opportunities 
Market to book ratio 1988 5.4180 63.1155 -1525.56 1758.11 
Policy changes 
(0,1) 
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for year 2009 and 
2014, and takes the value of 0 for other years  
1988 0.1429 0.3500 0 1 
Crisis (0,1) Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for year 2008 and 
2009,and takes the value of 0 for other years  
1988 0.1429 0.3500 0 1 
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among firms in the samples. Prior studies have reported this wide difference in firm's 
performance in the market such as in the work of Salawu et al. (2012) whom reported 
that there exists great disparity between firms in performance. The negative minimum 
value also indicates that some firms recorded losses over the period. The average 
investment opportunities (INV) measured by the market to book ratio is 5.418. This 
shows a big difference from the Nigeria market, which is less than one from the research 
conducted by Abdulkadir et al. (2015). Market to book ratio of more than one indicates 
there are a lot of valuable investment opportunities available amongst companies listed 
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Chung, Wright & Charoenwong, 1998), which is 
consistent with the rapid development of the stock market as described in chapter one. 
4.2 Multicollinearity Analysis 
It is necessary to examine the correlation between the independent variables used in the 
analysis. Thus, Table 4.2 presents pairwise correlation coefficients among the 
explanatory variables to detect whether any of them is highly correlated. Foreign 
ownership is positively and significantly correlated with dividend payment decision 
(0.15). The highest correlation coefficients are between policy changes and crisis (0.42) 
and ROA and RE/TE (0.29). However, these coefficients are below the benchmark of 
0.8 given by Hair et al. (2006) and unlikely to lead to multicollinearity problem. The 
existence or nonexistence of possible multicollinearity is confirmed further by variance 
inflation factors (VIF) test. The VIF values are presented in the Table 4.3. VIF for all 






Table 4.2  
Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
*significant at p<0.10, **significant at p<0.05, ***significant at p<0.01. Dummy variable which takes value of 1 if company pay dividend and 0 
otherwise (DIV); total percentage of foreign shareholding; the ratio of net operating cash flow divided by revenue (CF); natural log of total assets 
(SIZE); total liabilities to total assets (LEV); retained earnings divided by total equity (RE/TE); net income divided by total assets (ROA); market 
to book ratio (INV); dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for year 2009 and 2014 and takes the value of 0 for other years (POLY); dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 for year 2008 and 2009 and takes the value of 0 for other years (CRISIS). 
  DIV FOWNERS CF SIZE LEV RE/TE ROA INV POLY CRISIS 
DIV  1.0000          
FOWNERS  0.1542*** 1.0000         
CF  0.0213 -0.0514 1.0000        
SIZE  0.3677*** 0.0848** 0.0864** 1.0000       
LEV  -0.1509** 0.0358 -0.1563 -0.1900*** 1.0000      
RE/TE  0.2410*** 0.0954** -0.0444 0.2537*** -0.0764 1.0000     
ROA  0.0719* 0.0025 0.1817** 0.0462 -0.1214** 0.2948** 1.000    
INV  -0.0312 -0.0058 -0.0200 -0.090** -0.0053 0.0220 0.1225*** 1.000   
POLY  0.0294 0.0035 0.0085 0.0616** 0.0068 0.0131 -0.0164 0.019 1.000  
CRISIS  -0.0170 0.0213 0.0033 -0.0661 0.0441 -0.0206 -0.0285 -0.009 0.4167*** 1.000 
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(2010), VIF values above 10 indicate multicollinearity problem. The VIF values 
indicate absence of multicollinearity problem as the values fall below 10 for all  
independent variables. 
Table 4.3  




Foreign ownership 1.02 
Cash flow 1.08 
Size 1.15 
Leverage  1.07 
Retained earnings to total equity 1.20 
Profitability (ROA) 1.17 
Investment opportunities  1.03 
Policy changes 1.22 
Crisis  1.23 
 
4.3 Test for Model Fit  
The results of model fit tests are reported in Table 4.4. The model's overall goodness of 
fit is tested using the likelihood ratio 𝜒2 . The model's likelihood ratio 𝜒2  is 
statistically significant at 1% indicating goodness of fit of the whole model. Just like 
the likelihood ratio 𝜒2, the Wald test also uses for model fit test. The hypothesis of 
Wald test is all parameters are simultaneously equal to zero. The test result shows that 
the Wald chi-square test statistic of 166.3 which is significant at 1% significance level 
(p-value = 0.0000), thus we reject the hypothesis that all parameters are simultaneously 
equal to zero. This indicates that at least one of the coefficients in the model has effect 
on the dependent variable. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test which also indicates how well the model fits the data. Hosmer 
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and Lemeshow (2000) recommended partitioning observations into ten equal sized 
groups according to their predicted probabilities. Based on this, an insignificant chi- 
square indicates adequate fit of the model while a significant chi-square suggests that 
the model does not adequately fit the data. As shown in Table 4.4, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow 𝜒2 is insignificant (p-value= 0.1935), thus we fail to reject the hypothesis 
that no difference exists between1the.observed.and the model predicted values. 
Therefore, the estimates of the model fit the data at an acceptable level. The last test for 
goodness of fit is the percentage of correct predictions (PCP), which is obtained from a 
classification table shows the predictive power of the model by assessing the model's 
ability in classifying outcomes of the dependent variable. Thus, the PCP shows the 
extent to which the actual outcome corresponds to the predictions made. As indicated 
in the table, the percentage of cases correctly predicted is 71.93%. This is considered 
high as Pampel (2000) suggests between 50% and 100% correctly predicted cases as a 
measure of predictive accuracy. 
Table 4.4  
Tests for Goodness of Fit (Binomial Model) 
Tests Results  
Likelihood Ratio 𝜒2 p-value=0.0000 
Wald chi-square test  P-value=0.0000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value=0.1935 
Percent of correct prediction  PCP=  71.93% 
 
4.4 Test for Model Specification 
Apart from the goodness of fit tests, model specification check is also important as 
misleading inferences may result from an inappropriate model specification. Therefore, 
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in order to avoid bias and inconsistent results, link test was conducted in this study 
which is the general model specification test for non-linear regression models. The test 
is based on the notion that if a regression is properly specified, then any additional 
independent variable should be insignificant except by chance. 
 
Table 4.5  









Linktest shows two variables as indicated in Table 4.5. _hat represents the predicted 
value from the model and _hatsq represents the predictor to rebuild the model. 
According to Pregibon (1980), to pass the linktest, it is expected that _hat should be 
significant and _hatsq should be insignificant. The results show in table 4.5 indicate 
that the model is correctly specified as _hat is significant and _hatsq is insignificant. 
4.5 Panel Logistic Regression Analysis 
The study adopts panel analysis for logit regression. Hausman test conducted has 
𝜒2statistic of 25.71 and it is significant at (p>chi2 = 0.002) indicating that the fixed 
effect estimates are preferred to random effect estimates. Thus, the results are discussed 
based on the fixed effect estimates which are presented in Table 4.6. The reported 
coefficient estimates indicate the influence of the explanatory variables on the decision 
to pay dividends. 
Model 1 is the base model to measure the relationship between foreign ownership and 
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dividend payment decisions which measured by a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm pays dividend and 0 if otherwise. In model 2, the study incorporates firm 
characteristics which have been used to explain Chinese companies’ dividend policy. 
In model 3, the study extends the model to include macroeconomic variables.  
Table 4.6  
Determinants of Dividend Payout Decision (Fixed Effect Logistic Regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






























Policy changes   0.1258 
(-0.27) 
Crisis    -0.0542 
(-0.27) 
 LR χ2 
Wald χ2 











*significant at p<0.10, **significant at p<0.05, ***significant at p<0.01. z-stat are in 
parentheses;  
The results presented in Table 4.6 shows that foreign ownership is consistently 
significant for all the models in which it appeared, although the coefficient is not large.  
The coefficient of foreign ownership is significantly positive in all the models. Thus, 
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the higher the level of foreign ownership the higher the likelihood to pay dividends. 
This finding provides strong evidence in support of agency theory. Based on agency 
theory, foreign shareholders treat dividend payments as a substitute to direct monitoring 
to prevent managers from over-investment. The finding is in accordance with prior 
studies in India (Manos, 2003), Korea (Jeon et al., 2011; Chai, 2010), Japan ( Baba, 
2009) and Pakistan (Ullah, Fida & Khan, 2012) where a reported positive and 
significant relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payment decision is 
reported.  
The result contradicts other studies that reported a negative and significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and dividend policy. Dahlquist and Robertsson’s (2001) 
study of the Swedish market reveals that foreigners show a preference for firms paying 
low dividends. Ferreira et al. (2010) study also showed that foreign institutional 
investors dislike dividend distribution while domestic investors desire dividends as the 
foreign institutional investors have to bear higher dividend tax and transaction costs. 
Ferreira et al. (2010) argued the greater the tax disadvantage of dividends to 
international investors, and the higher are transaction costs related to repatriating and 
reinvesting dividends, the more international investors push for fewer dividends. 
However, based on tax induced clientele effect advanced by Brennan (1970) and Elton 
and Gruber (1970), foreign ownership may be positively or negatively related to 
dividend policy depending on the tax advantaged or disadvantaged. Comparison to the 
54 
 
Swedish 30% flat rate5, 30% withholding tax rate in New Zealand6, and 69% marginal 
tax rate in Australia for dividend7, not more than 10% tax rate for dividend in China8 
shows a big tax advantaged. Due to this, foreign shareholders prefer dividend 
distribution in China as shown by the positive relationship between foreign ownership 
and dividend payment decision. This is an support to the clientele effect theory from 
the tax advantage perspective. In addition, foreign shareholders generally face a high 
degree of informational asymmetry relative to domestic shareholders. As such foreign 
shareholders in China treat dividends as a substitute to direct monitoring of firms 
targeted at reducing over-investment problem (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). 
In model 2, among all the companies control variables, only size, leverage and retained 
earnings to total equity show a significant effect on dividend payment decision. The 
coefficient of retained earnings to total equity is significantly positive in model 2 and 
model 3. This indicates that the more firms rely on retained earnings, the higher the 
likelihood of them to pay dividends. Findings which indicate positive relationship 
between retained earnings to total equity and decision to pay dividends is consistence 
with the prediction of the life cycle theory where firms in the maturity stage of their 
lifecycle have fewer investment opportunities, thus they have better ability to pay 
dividend (DeAngelo et. al, 2006). This finding supports the results of earlier studies 
conducted by El-Ansary and Gomaa (2012), Khani and Dehghani (2011) and Bradford 
                                                   
5 See Sweden: Individual - Income determination, Worldwide Tax Summaries, at 
http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Sweden-Individual-Income-determination 
6 See Non-resident withholding tax (NRWT): NRWT payers, New Zealand Inland Revenue, at 
http://www.ird.govt.nz/nrwt/nrwt-payers/ 
7 See Tax rates – foreign resident, Australian Taxation Office 
8 See State Administration of Taxation (SAT) Public Notice [2008] No.2, Public Notice of the List of Dividend 
Tax Rates Issued under the Agreement 
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et al. (2013). As for company’s size, it has a positive and significant effect on the 
decision to pay dividend among companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
This indicates that the larger the size of a company, the higher the likelihood for 
companies to pay dividend. This finding is in line with the results reported by Jasim 
and Hameeda (2011), Al-Malkawi (2007) and Fama and French (2001).  
The result of the study also shows a significant negative coefficient of leverage 
indicating that firms with a higher leverage is less likely to pay dividends. The finding 
concurs with the view of Rozeff (1982) that high levered firms maintain a low dividend 
payment in order to reduce transaction cost associated with external financing. This 
may result from the need for high levered firms to hold back funds for debt servicing 
and the need to prevent obtaining additional external finance in order to minimize 
transaction cost associated with external financing (Abdulkadir et al., 2015), thus 
lowering the funds available for dividend distribution. This finding also matches the 
results of other studies conducted by Bradford et al. (2013), Huda and Abdullah (2013) 
and Al-Malkawi (2008) where a negative and significant relationship was documented 
between leverage and dividend payout. 
Other than the three control variables, the results of cash flow, profitability and 
investment opportunities are insignificant. The insignificant result of investment 
opportunities supports the finding of Fama (1974) and D'Souza (1999) where 
investment opportunities and dividend decisions were found to be unrelated. The 
insignificant results of cash flow and investment opportunities indicate that dividend 
payment decision are not support by signaling theory.  
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The two controlled variables (policy changes and crisis) which were controlled for in 
model 3 are insignificant with positive and negative coefficients, respectively. The 
results imply that policy changes and crisis have no significant effect on dividend 
payment decisions. The result for dividend policy changes is consistent with Adaoglu 
(2008) findings in Turkey.  
4.6. Odds Ratio for Decision to Pay or Not to Pay Dividends 
Logistic estimates are presented in terms of the logit coefficients or odds ratio. This is 
because odds ratio presents an easier alternative to interpreting the estimates. More so, 
odds ratio are considered to be more informative (Menard, 2002). This is because it 
tells how many times the likelihood of occurrence relative to non-occurrence will 
increase or decrease when the explanatory variable changes by one unit. Therefore, 
logistic regression analysis indicate how the odds change when a particular explanatory 
variable changes. Odds is the ratio of probability of an event occurring to the probability 
of the event not occurring (Gujarati, 2004). An odds ratio greater than 1 corresponds to 
a positive logit coefficient while odds ratio of less than one corresponds to a negative 
logit coefficient. The odds ratio in this study is the ratio of probability of decision "to 
pay" to the probability of the decision "not to pay". Table 4.7 presents the odds ratio 
based on the expanded model of the fixed effect estimates. 
Odds ratio for each explanatory variable is interpreted given that the other variables in 
the model are held constant. Based on this, the odds ratio presented in Table 4.7 
indicates that if foreign ownership increases by one point, the odds of taking the 
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decision "to pay" relative to "not to pay" is expected to increase by 1.04 units. Similarly, 
if retained earnings to total equity increases by one point, then the odds of decision "to 
pay" relative to "not to pay" is expected to increase by 2.53 units. If the company’s size 
increase by one point, he odds of taking the decision "to pay" relative to "not to pay" is 
expected to increase by 4.78 units. On the other hand, if leverage increases by one point, 
the odds of decision "to pay" relative to "not to pay" is expected to decrease by 0.04 
units. The probability of paying dividends in policy changes years (2004 and 2014) is 
1.03 times higher than the years without policy changes. Similarity, the probability of 
paying dividends in crisis years (2008 and 2009) is 1.05 times higher than the years 
without crisis. 
Table 4.7  
Odds Ratio of Decision " To Pay" or "Not to Pay" 
 Odds ratio z-stat 
Foreign ownership 1.0353*** 5.50 
Cash flow  0.8311 -1.9 
Size 4.7843*** 13.59 
Leverage  0.0378*** -10.65 
RE/TE 2.5271*** 6.31 
Profitability (ROA) 0.9623 -0.15 
Investment opportunities 0.9994 -0.30 
Policy changes 1.0268 0.16 
Crisis  1.0532 0.31 
***significant at p<0.01 
4.7 Robustness Check for Panel Logistic Regression Model 
It is necessary to assess the model for robustness of its key findings. Thus, it is 
expected that the main conclusions as derived from the signs and significance level of 
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key variable(s) should hold even when the variables are subjected to different model 
specification. This sub-section examines whether the initial results are driven by the 
use of a dummy variable as proxy for dividend payout policy as opposed to the use of 
dividend scaled by total assets. Therefore, an alternative measure of dividend policy 
(dividend scaled by total assets) is employed for robustness check on model 3 
(including of all variables). Since this new dependent variable is not in discrete choice 
form, the study estimates panel linear regression as reported in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8  
Determinants of Dividend Payout Decision (Fixed Effect Regression) 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>I t I 
Intercept -0.6021485  0.0835999 -7.20 0.000*** 
Foreign 
ownership 
0.0027948  0.0048118 5.10 0.000*** 
Cash flow 0.0034202 0.0048118 0.71 0.477 
Size  0.0832546 0.0086808 9.59 0.000*** 
Leverage  -0.025628 0.0063449  -4.04 0.000*** 
RE/TE -0.0137017 0.0081143     -1.69 0.091* 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
0.039322 0.0188693 2.08 0.037** 
Investment 
opportunities  
-0.0000325 0.0000793 -0.41 0.682 
Policy changes -0.0150328 0.0156134 -0.96 0.335 
Crisis  -0.0078023  0.0156134 -0.50  0.617  
No. of obs 1988 
 
   
*significant at p<0.10; **significant at p<0.05; ***significant at p<0.01; DV= 
Dividend/Total Assets. 
 
The findings on foreign ownership effect on dividend payout policy remains unaltered 
as it is still significantly positive. Thus, the finding is robust to the use of alternative 
59 
 
measure of dividend payout policy. in comparison to the results obtained in Table 4.6 
to 4.8 indicate that more variables which include foreign ownership, size, leverage, 
retained earnings to total equity and profitability explain the amount of dividends paid. 
Contrarily, the insignificance of profitability in the non-linear model as shown in Table 
4.6 shows that profitability cannot explain the initial decision on whether or not to pay 
dividends. However, it is relevant in explaining how much to pay. The results obtained 
from the logit estimates and those obtained in the linear regression are both useful to 
shareholders in making investment decisions. For those who are not concerned on how 
much dividend is being paid out, there are four factors (foreign ownership, size, 
leverage and RE/TE) that need to be considered. However, for investors who are 
particular on how much dividend is to be paid, profitability is an additional factor to be 
considered in their investment decision making. 
4.8 Summary of Chapter 
The chapter provides answers to the research question raised in the study on the effect 
of foreign ownership on dividend policy. In order to address the research question, 
binomial panel logistic was carried out. Overall, empirical result suggests that foreign 
ownership play a very important role in a firm's decision to pay dividends on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This is confirmed from the robustness check where further 
evidence is provided that the significant explanatory role of foreign ownership is not 
limited to the decision to pay or not to pay. It also has impacts on the amount of 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the main findings of the study, the implications, 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This study was conducted to examine whether the foreign ownership affect companies’ 
dividend policy in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Based on a sample of 142 firms over 
14 years (2003-2016), panel logistic regression results show that there is a significant 
positive relationship between foreign ownership and dividend payment decision. The 
results of the robustness test further indicate that foreign ownership not only have an 
impact on the dividend payment decision, but also affect the amount of dividend 
payment. The higher the level of foreign ownership, the higher the likelihood to pay 
dividends and the more dividend being payout. In addition, the company’s 
characteristic also have an effect on dividend policy for companies listed in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Results of the study indicate that big size, low leverage and 
high retained earnings to total equity (mature stage) companies are most likely to pay 
dividend. However, the results show that crisis and policy changes have an insignificant 
effect on payout decision.  
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5.2 Implications of the Study 
In addition to the theoretical implications discussed in the previous chapter, findings of 
the study also have implication for policy and practice. Findings suggest that firms 
shape their payout policy in line with the preference of foreign investors. As indicated 
by the results, the foreign shareholders in the Chinese market have high preference for 
dividend paying stocks. If a company wants to attract foreign investors, it should choose 
a payout policy to cater for the needs of foreign investors. For investors who prefer 
dividends, they should invest in companies with foreign ownership as the likelihood of 
these companies to pay dividend is higher. For the Chinese government, it should 
continue with the existing policy on dividend or improve further on the policy as it is 
shown in Figure 1.3 that foreign fund investing in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
continue to increase. 
5.3 Limitation and Suggestion for Future Research 
Due to time constraint, this study only includes listed companies that have foreign 
ownership in the mainboard of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Therefore, the result may 
not be applicable to the whole market. Furthermore, the study excluded financial firms 
due to the different regulatory structure and as such findings of the study may not be 
applicable to such firms. Therefore, further research can be conducted on all companies 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange to examine 
whether or not foreign ownership has an effect on dividend policy. A comparative 
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analysis of the effect among mainboard, SME board and ChiNext will also be an 
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